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Abstract. John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness is the most sys-
tematic attempt to provide a liberal grounding for justice in 
plural democratic societies. Rawls argued that social and 
economic inequalities were justifiable only if they were to the 
advantage of society’s least-advantaged members. Rawls 
argued that the citizen with the lowest expectation for pri-
mary social goods occupied the least-advantaged position in 
society (PSGs are all-purpose means like income, wealth and 
opportunity). In his theory, the least advantaged are the least 
well-off citizens. This paper argues that Rawls’s theory is 
correct, but requires certain emendations to inform the 
actual practice of plural democracies. In particular, Rawls 
had stipulated in theory that society was both “closed” and 
“well-ordered”. In practice, these assumptions no longer 
hold true. This has the effect of broadening the idea of the 
least-advantaged citizens. In particular, the least-advantaged 
become the least well-off (Rawls), the least capable (Amartya 
Sen) and the misrecognised (Charles Taylor).  This paper 
focuses on the third type of disadvantaged citizens, those 
whose identities are misrecognised. Misrecognition of iden-
tity can cause harm; it can restrict the agency and opportuni-
ty. Minority identity groups (whose identities are often mis-
recognised) do not do as well as others citizens in social, 
economic and political terms. 
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Résumé. La Justice comme équité de John Rawls est la 
tentative la plus systématique d’offrir un fondement libéral 
de justice dans les sociétés démocratiques plurielles. Rawls 
défend l’idée que les inégalités sociales et économiques ont 
été légitimes uniquement quand elles profitaient aux 
membres les moins avantagés de la société. Rawls dit que le 
citoyen qui a le moins d’attentes pour les biens sociaux pri-
maires (par exemple revenu, richesse et opportunité) occu-
pait la position la moins avantagée dans la société. Dans sa 
théorie, les moins avantagés sont les citoyens les moins 
riches. Cet article suggère que la théorie de Rawls est fondée, 
mais nécessite certaines corrections pour saisir la pratique 
actuelle des démocraties plurielles. En particulier, Rawls a 
affirmé que la société est en théorie « fermée » et « bien 
ordonnée ». En pratique, ces hypothèses ne tiennent pas.  
Cela a pour effet d’élargir l’idée des citoyens les moins avan-
tagés. Ainsi, le moins avantagé devient le moins riche 
(Rawls), le moins capable (Amartya Sen) et le moins reconnu 
(Charles Taylor). Cet article se penche sur le troisième type 
de citoyens désavantagés, ceux dont les identités sont mé-
connues. La méconnaissance d’identité peut nuire à autrui; 
elle peut limiter la capacité et l’opportunité. Les minorités 
identitaires (dont les identités sont souvent méconnues) ne 
font pas aussi bien que les autres citoyens en termes social, 
économique et politique. 
 






John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness is the most discussed at-
tempt in recent decades to address democratic pluralism.  
An attractive aspect of Rawls’s theory from a democratic, 
egalitarian viewpoint is that he argued that social and eco-
nomic inequalities were justifiable only if they were to the 
advantage of society’s least-advantaged members. Ad-
vantage, Rawls explained, could be gauged by considering 
one’s expectation for primary social goods, which were re-
quired to develop and exercise the capacities for democratic 
citizenship, and were to act as all-purpose means to one’s 
conception of the good. The primary social goods are rights 
and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, 
and the social bases of self-respect, (1971: 62). Rawls argued 
that the least-advantaged position was occupied by the citi-
zen with the lowest expectation for primary social goods 
(1971:90-93).   This is correct, as far is it goes, but this essay 
considers why some may find themselves in less advantaged 
social and economic positions in the first place. When con-
sidering this prior issue, one finds two answers to the ques-
tion of who are the least-advantaged.  The least-advantaged 
citizens become those who: a) are not capable of using pri-
mary social goods as means to their ends, and b) those 
whose identities are misrecognised.1 
To explain, Rawls’s well-ordered society was closed. He 
did not discuss immigration, for example, in relation to his 
democratic theory of justice for pluralistic societies. Rawls’s 
theory then, considers a range of diversity more limited than 
is present in actual plural democracies. This is not to assert 
that Rawls’s theory is incorrect, but rather to say that in 
applying Rawlsian ideas to actual plural democracies, which 
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are neither closed, nor well-ordered, some emendations are 
required.
 
I shall support the main claim of the paper (that 
the misrecognised are part of the disadvantaged) by building 
on Charles Taylor’s assertion that the misrecognition of 
identity causes harm, and discussing this in relation to 
Rawls’s most important primary good, the social bases of 
self-respect.  Before supporting this claim, however, it may 
be helpful to briefly recount Justice as Fairness. 
 
2: Justice as Fairness 
 
As Samuel Freeman writes: 
John Rawls is the most significant and influential political 
and moral philosopher of the twentieth century. His work 
has profoundly shaped contemporary discussions of social, 
political, and economic justice in philosophy, law, political 
science, economics, and other social disciplines.(2003: pref-
ace). 
Rawls re-vitalised the field of political philosophy by pub-
lishing a treatise on justice. A Theory of Justice has been 
translated into twenty-seven languages. A mere ten years 
after Theory's publication (1971), it had been cited in over 
2,500 books and articles (2003: preface). Rawls’s theory 
Justice as Fairness was the catalyst for a wide-ranging de-
bate from the 1970s through to the present regarding appro-
priate conceptions of justice for plural societies.   
Rawls was attempting to find a philosophic basis for 
democratic institutions to develop a conception of political 
justice —“Justice as Fairness”. Rawls posited that certain 
‘fundamental ideas’ would give an overall structure to Jus-
tice as Fairness.  The first such idea is that of social co-
operation, which has three features. Rawls explained that: 
[S]ocial co-operation is guided by publicly recognised rules 
and procedures which those co-operating accept as appro-
priate to regulate their conduct… 
Fair terms of co-operation specify an idea of reciprocity, or 
mutuality: all who do their part as the recognised rules re-
quire are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon 
standard. 
 The idea of co-operation also includes the idea of each par-
ticipant’s rational advantage, or good.  The idea of rational 
advantage specifies what it is that those engaged in co-
operation are seeking to advance from the standpoint of 
their own good (2001: 6). 
Two complementary ideas are added to the concept of social 
co-operation. These are the rational and the reasonable.
2
 
Rational is to indicate the efficient pursuit of one’s overall 
account of the good, which ought to match one’s abilities and 
interests. Reasonable is a moral conception, which acts to 
constrain what one’s rational good may be. Those engaged in 
social co-operation are, Rawls explained, “equals in relevant 
respects” (2001: 6). It is rational, for example, to use others 
as means to help accomplish one’s goals, but this would not 
be reasonable. One’s good becomes the satisfaction of one’s 
rational and reasonable desire (2001: 154). 
 
 
2.1: The Original Position 
In the spirit of the social contract tradition, Rawls imagined 
an original position, which was a hypothetical device de-
signed to focus reflection on what the representatives of free, 
rational and equal citizens would accept as principles of 
justice to guide their society. The veil of ignorance functions 
to hide the representatives' knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of the lives of those they represent. Hypothet-
ical representatives behind the veil of ignorance (to help 
model impartiality) are unbiased in their deliberations re-
garding the just principles required to regulate the institu-
tions of a free society, the basic structure.   
Rawls explained that: “… the significance of the original 
position lies in the fact that it is a device of representation or, 
alternatively, a thought–experiment for the purpose of pub-
lic and self-clarification” (2001: 17). The original position is 
both hypothetical and non-historical. A "reasonable moral 
psychology" was asserted to make agreement possible. Rawls 
reasoned that the representatives would choose principles of 
justice that guarantee the freedom of citizens and seek to 
maximise the position of the least advantaged, lest it be 
occupied by one they are attempting to represent. (The veil 
hides this information from the representatives in the origi-
nal position). 
 
2.2: The Two Moral Powers  
(Rationality & Reasonableness) 
The freedom and equality of citizens is premised on the 
assertion that citizens in a democratic and plural society 
would have developed certain cognitive and moral capaci-
ties, which Rawls described as moral powers, and later also 
characterised as citizen capabilities (2001: 169). Rawls stat-
ed: 
Let’s say they are regarded as equal in that they are all re-
garded as having to the essential minimum degree the moral 
powers necessary too engage in social co-operation… [T]hat 
is, since we view society as a fair system of co-operation, the 
basis of equality is having to the requisite minimum degree 
the moral and other capacities that enable us to take part 
fully in the cooperative life of society. (2001: 20). 
[W]e say that citizens are regarded as free persons in two re-
spects. First, citizens are free in that they conceive of them-
selves and one another as having the moral power to have a 
conception of the good… A second respect in which citizens 
view themselves as free is that they regard themselves as 
self-authenticating sources of valid claims. That is, they re-
gard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their 
institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good… 
(2001: 21-23). 
Rawls asserted the bases of democratic freedom and equality 
by posting that all citizens had developed the two moral 
powers (rationality and reasonableness) to a “requisite min-
imum degree.” Rawls explained that the fair value of political 
liberties (included in the index of PSGs), “…ensures that 
citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal 
chance of influencing the government's policy and of attain-
ing positions of authority irrespective of their economic and 
social class” (2001: 46).  
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It is important to note the relationship between PSGs 
and the two moral powers. Rawls stated: “[The] basic rights 
and liberties protect and secure the scope required for the 
exercise of the two moral powers…” (2001: 45). We are to 
draw up a list of basic liberties in two ways. The first is his-
torical; we make a list of liberties by considering which of 
these are secure in historically successful regimes. Second, 
we consider “…what liberties provide the political and social 
conditions essential for the adequate development and full 
exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons” 
(2001: 45). The fair value of political liberties is to enable 
citizens to maintain their free and equal status as specified 
by the two moral powers. 
 
2.3: Primary Social Goods 
Norman Daniels explains that in order to simplify the initial 
construction theory, Justice as Fairness, Rawls assumed 
citizens were fully capable and thus removed disability as a 
source of inequalities (2003: 242). With this assumption in 
place, Rawls argued that all-purpose means (PSGs) could 
indicate one's advantage. Rawls originally defined primary 
goods as: 
...things which it is supposed a rational man [or woman] 
wants whatever else he [or she] wants. Regardless of what 
an individual's rational plans are in detail, it is assumed that 
there are various things which he [or she] would prefer 
more of rather than less (1971: 92). 
Specifically, Rawls identified rights, liberties, opportunities, 
power, income, wealth and the social bases self-respect as 
PSGs. The use and understanding of primary goods is 
straightforward with the exception of the social bases of self-
respect, which requires some explanation. Rawls defined 
self-respect as including: 
...A person's sense of his [or her] own value, his [or her] se-
cure conviction that his [or her] conception of his [or her] 
good, his [or her] plan of life, is worth carrying out. And se-
cond, self-respect implies a confidence in one's ability, as far 
as it is within one's power, to fulfil one's intentions (1971: 
440). 
Self-respect is about what is worthwhile. It can only be at-
tained if one sees value in doing one's projects. To determine 
what is "valuable", individuals require the two moral powers, 
(reasonableness and rationality).  Citizens must have the 
capacity for a sense of justice, and the capacity to form a 
conception of the good (1993: 81). 
Rawls also wished to clarify whether primary goods were 
dependent on “…the natural facts of human psychology or… 
on a moral conception of the person…” (1999:  preface xiii). 
Rawls explained: 
This ambiguity is to be resolved in favour of the latter: per-
sons are to be viewed as having two moral powers… and as 
having higher-order interests in developing and exercising 
those powers. Primary goods are now characterised as what 
persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and 
as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a 
complete life (1999: preface xiii). 
A person's 'good' is the satisfaction of her rational (and 
reasonable) desire. Rationality and reasonableness are the 
necessary moral powers for free and equal citizenship, which 
require primary goods for their exercise and development. 
 
2.4: Reasonable Pluralism 
Rawls argued that citizens would be 'reasonable' in a number 
of ways. Citizens would have goals and doctrines that would 
be publicly justifiable in light of the principles of justice.  
Citizens would accept the principles of justice as fair, and 
that those principles shape and constrain their public activi-
ties in a number of ways. Under the reasonable and rational 
constraints of the original position, hypothetical citizen 
representatives (suitably characterised as unbiased) would 
select principles of justice to regulate the basic structure 
(society's main political and economic institutions, which 
further act to regulate society generally).   
A Theory of Justice was, Rawls explained: "to generalise 
and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional 
doctrine of the social contract" (1993: preface).  Given some 
of the criticisms raised against Theory, Rawls thought it 
necessary to clarify one point in particular. In Theory (1971), 
he had not made a clear distinction between moral and 
political conceptions. The scope of Rawls's theory appeared 
wider than he had intended. In Political Liberalism (1993), 
Rawls wanted to demonstrate that one could hold a compre-
hensive moral doctrine that differed from the views of one's 
fellow citizens and remain a full, free and equal member of 
the political community. 
Rawls asserted that democratic societies are marked by 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. Reasonable pluralism 
means citizens will hold publicly justifiable (reasonable), but 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines (2001: 3). Public 
reasons are required for justification; one should not refer-
ence one's own (controversial) comprehensive doctrine in 
justifying one's political views and preferences to others. 
Such doctrines posit something is right, true, or good—they 
are belief systems. Reasonable takes on a moral character in 
that it specifies relations of reciprocity and justification. By 
reciprocity, Rawls meant that citizens would have a willing-
ness to propose and accept fair terms of social co-operation 
(2001: 6). Rawls explained that:  
[T]he aim of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions 
of the possibility of a reasonable public basis of justification 
on fundamental political questions. … In doing this, it has to 
distinguish the public point of view from the many non-
public reasons and to explain why public reason takes the 
form it does (1993: preface). 
Political liberalism, Rawls argued, does not lend itself to 
identifying any moral truths. It does not even hold that 
Justice as Fairness is true. It is concerned that comprehen-
sive doctrines be reasonable. It holds that Justice as Fair-
ness is reasonable. Political liberalism concerns itself with 
political values.  
Reasonable citizens, Rawls argued, would be ready to en-
gage in fair terms of co-operation. They would also recognise 
that some comprehensive doctrines could not be publicly 
justified. Citizens would further want to be recognised as 
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normal and co-operating members of society. Finally, Rawls 
asserted that citizens would have a reasonable moral psy-
chology (1993: 82). 
Rawls's main ideal was citizenship characterised by Jus-
tice as Fairness. Citizens are to be reasonable, rational, free, 
and equal (1993: 84). Rawls argued that:  
Justice as Fairness connects the desire to realise a political 
ideal of citizenship with citizens' two moral powers [sense of 
justice and conception of the good] and their normal capaci-
ties, as these are educated to that ideal by the public culture 
and its historical traditions of interpretation (1993: 85).  
Rawls's principles of justice are the result of a rational con-
struct (the original position) subject to reasonable con-
straints (public reason and reciprocity). The principles 
generated will support reasonable (political) judgements. By 
sharing a reasonable political conception of justice —Justice 
as Fairness, citizens have a shared basis for public discus-
sion, which is an important innovation given the fact of 
diversity. 
 
2.5: The Principles of Justice 
Rawls thought the account of political liberalism given in A 
Theory of Justice (1971) was correct for the most part, but 
misunderstood. Rawls believed the idea of political liberal-
ism was misunderstood because he had not adequately ex-
plained certain ideas in the work. Rawls was not satisfied 
with the revisions made in Political Liberalism (1993). Sev-
eral substantial essays were published to further elaborate 
how Rawls's views had changed, and several were concerned 
with providing answers to various critics.  It became “diffi-
cult to find a clear and consistent” view of Rawls’s work as a 
whole. This difficulty gave rise to Rawls's final work, Justice 
as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). Rawls indicated that the 
restatement contained three changes to the overall idea of 
Justice as Fairness. First, the formulation and content of the 
principles of justice were revised. Second, the organisation of 
the argument for the principles in the original position was 
re-worked. Finally, Rawls re-iterated that Justice as Fair-
ness must be viewed as a political conception, not dependent 
on any particular comprehensive view. Rawls’s final state-
ment of the principles of justice reads as follows: 
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully ade-
quate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is com-
patible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; 
and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society… (2001: 42-43) 
The first principle remains lexically prior. In addition, the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity is prior to the differ-
ence principle (the second half of the second principle). By 
priority, Rawls meant prior principles were assumed satis-
fied.  The main changes pertain to the first principle. It is 
now to be understood as a principle of liberties, rather than 
liberty.   
It would be misleading and unfair to critique Justice as 
Fairness on the grounds of whether it could actually be 
realised in practice; as this was not the intention in writing 
the theory. Actual democracies are neither well-ordered, nor 
closed, yet they are marked by deep diversity. With Rawls’s 
main ideas in the background, this paper seeks to amplify 
and extend one idea in particular. This is the idea of the least 
advantaged. Rawls stated: 
In a well-ordered society where all citizens’ equal basic 
rights and liberties and fair opportunities are secure, the 
least advantaged are those belonging to the income class 
with lowest expectations (2001: 59). 
Rawls further explained that his idea of least-advantaged 
could not identify any other features such as “race, gender, 
nationality, and the like” (2001: 59, note 26). It is at this 
point that this paper diverges from Rawls’s theory. In theory, 
one can assume adequate citizen capability, that all citizens 
are reasonable, and rights, liberties and opportunities are 
secure. In practice, these assumptions are too strong. 
 
3: The Least-Advantaged in practice 
 
Given his theoretical assumptions, Rawls cogently argued 
that the least-advantaged citizens would have the lowest 
expectation for primary social goods like income and wealth. 
The least advantaged citizen became the least well off.  To 
explain, in theory, Rawls assumed that all citizens had de-
veloped “two moral powers”, which were generally charac-
terised as rational and reasonable. With this assumption in 
place, Rawls coherently argued that the least-advantaged 
would be those with the least expectations for primary social 
goods. Recall that PSGs are intended as all-purpose means 
for citizens to express and pursue their conceptions of the 
good. If one assumes adequate capability development as 
Rawls had, then what is required to raise the expectations of 
the least advantaged is a higher share in the distribution of 
PSGs as Rawls had argued and addressed through the differ-
ence principle. If one does not assume adequate capability, 
then any increased distribution of PSGs, say income for 
example, will not raise the expectations of the least advan-
taged. When moving from the theory Justice as Fairness, to 
the practice of plural democracy, two additional ideas must 
be encompassed by the concept of least advantaged. The 
least advantaged in plural democracies become the least 
well off, the least capable, and the misrecognised. 
 
4: Self-Respect Re-visited 
 
Rawls identified “the social bases of self-respect” (a primary 
social good), as crucially important in regards to the individ-
ual having the capacity and desire to carry out her plan of 
life—to express her “good” (1971: 440). Self-respect is social-
ly dependent—it requires the effective recognition of value in 
one’s person and goals by others. In the theory of Justice as 
Fairness, the political bases for self-respect appear to be 
conflated with the social bases for self-respect. Rawls, for 
example, stated that, “The social bases of self-respect, un-
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derstood as those aspects of basic institutions normally 
essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as 
persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-
confidence” (2001: 59).  Two questions immediately arise. 
First, one must question which aspects of which basic insti-
tutions Rawls was referring to here. Second, what is the 
supposed connection between citizenship, and one’s worth 
as a person? In answer, Rawls stated that: “[The] social 
bases of self-respect are things like the institutional fact that 
citizens have equal basic rights, and the public recognition of 
that fact and that everyone endorses the difference principle, 
itself a form of reciprocity” (2001: 60).  The “social bases” of 
self-respect are found in political equality.  To be fair, Rawls 
was not discussing the actual practice of plural democracy, 
but an idealised well-ordered society. Conflating the political 
and social bases of self-respect becomes problematic when 
moving from theory of Justice as Fairness to the practice of 
plural democracy. This is not a criticism of Rawls’s theory 
per se, but rather a difficulty one must overcome when ex-
propriating Rawls’s theory to help inform the actual practice 
of plural democracies as this paper does. In Rawls’s well-
ordered and closed society, there are no marginalised citi-
zens as the above quotations about the social bases of self-
respect show. In actual, plural democracies, however, there 
are politically, economically and social marginalised citizens, 
who have the same political rights and opportunities as other 
individual citizens, but nonetheless, remain marginalised. 
This must be taken into account. The way this paper at-
tempts to do this is to distinguish between the social and 
political bases of self-respect. Consider the rather different 
connotations of the following statements. “You are a fellow 
citizen, so I tolerate you and your reasonable activities.” 
“You are an admirable person; I respect you and your activi-
ties.” Which of these statements offers a more secure social 
base of self-respect? It seems obvious enough that the se-
cond statement offers a more secure social base of self-
respect. It entails both respect for the person and her activi-
ties because it recognises value in both. There is, however, 
no reason to choose between these two notions of respect—
they work in tandem. As a democratic citizen, I may enjoy 
both the political base of self-respect (valued as an equal 
fellow citizen) and the social base of self-respect (valued for 
the particular person I am, and things I do). The point is that 
in practice the social bases of self-respect are wider than the 
political bases of self-respect. 
Liberalism asserts that a central component of a good life 
is that it is be free. Part of the liberal idea of freedom is to 
express what one values.  This expression of value, however, 
requires that the individual have the confidence to carry out 
her life in this way. This confidence comes from the self-
respect an individual has. This is why Rawls counted the 
social bases of self-respect the most important primary 
social good. 
Self-respect has a social character; it is dependent on the 
recognition of value by others. The social base for self-
respect is finding one’s person and projects valued by others.  
In order for others to see value in our persons and projects, 
they must have similar or overlapping moral frameworks.  
Rawls referred to this as an overlapping consensus (2001: 
180-201). If others have very different, but reasonable moral 
frameworks, they can still value one as a fellow citizen—still 
offer a political base of self-respect. When, however, others 
share or have overlapping moral frameworks, the social 
bases of self-respect are extended. In both senses in which 
the bases of self-respect are being discussed here, the linch-
pin is others recognising value in one either as a fellow citi-




5: Identity and Freedom are inter-linked   
 
The central feature of contemporary democracies is the long 
established idea that individual citizens are free and equal. 
Individual rights of citizenship are established to secure 
citizens’ free and equal status.  There are contentious issues 
surrounding just what democratic freedom and equality 
mean.  Part of the controversy arises from the fact of plural-
ism. Pluralism means that citizens have different character-
istics and self-understandings, or more simply, different 
identities. Citizenship is accorded to the individual; the 
identity of the individual, however, is a social construct often 
dependent on group membership. Identity and freedom are 
inter-linked. This gives rise to a particular difficulty in liber-
al, democratic theory. If one is a member of an illiberal 
group, one cannot express one’s identity and minimally 
suffers a loss of freedom. If, on the other hand, the group 
with which one identifies becomes liberalised, then members 
of the group may well lose precisely what they are struggling 
to keep-their distinct identities. 
Theoretically, a free individual may choose any state, or 
object available to her. Practically, the individual will not do 
this because what she will freely choose is dependent on 
what she values. Following Charles Taylor’s dialogic account 
of identity, one's identity strongly shapes one's sense of 
worth, and what one will value (1989: 3-12). Identity and 
freedom are interlinked.  
The difference principle (the second half of Rawls’s se-
cond principle of justice) clearly states that social and eco-
nomic inequalities can only be justified if they are to the 
advantage of society’s least-advantaged citizens. The idea is 
appealing on a number of counts. Surely, history demon-
strates that social and economic inequalities affect life pro-
spects. From a democratic, egalitarian perspective, the goal 
of free and equal citizenship requires attention to social and 
economic inequities. For Rawls, the person in the least-
advantaged position in society had the lowest legitimate 
expectations for primary social goods. This is correct as far 
as it goes, but how does one come to occupy a less advanta-
geous position in the first place? One good answer, princi-
pally advanced by Amartya Sen is that perhaps one does not 
have capability to do better.
4
 Another answer is that one did 
not have the opportunity to improve one’s social and eco-
nomic position, and so on. What I wish to focus on is the 
claim that those whose cultural, religious, ethnic and gender 
identities are misrecognised or ignored constitute part of 
society’s least-advantaged members. In making this argu-
ment, it is helpful to consider a point made by Jean-Jacques 
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Rousseau in the Discourse on Inequality. For Rousseau, the 
idea of inequality was of little natural significance. Inequali-
ties become significant once people become comparative in 
social settings. In particular, what others think of us began 
to matter. Rousseau states: 
Each one began to look at the others and too be looked at 
himself, and public esteem had a value… From these first 
preferences were born vanity and contempt on the one 
hand, and shame and envy on the other… As soon as men 
had begun mutually to value one another, and the idea of es-
teem was formed in their minds, each one claimed to have a 
right to it… [E]very voluntary wrong became an outrage, be-
cause along with the harm that resulted from the injury, the 
offended party saw in it contempt for his person, which of-
ten was more insufferable than the harm itself… (1987: 64). 
The point remains valid today. When a person or group feels 
slighted by others, this is taken as morally significant. This 
perception is what allows Charles Taylor to argue that the 
misrecognition of identity causes harm. Taylor states: 
[O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, 
often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or 
group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confin-
ing or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. 
Nonrecongition or misrecognition can inflict harm; can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distort-
ed, and reduced mode of living (1994: 25). 
Contempt for and misrecognition of identity is a significant 
harm. There is a strong connection between one’s identity 
and one’s agency. Given this connection, if one’s identity is 
misrecognised or ignored, one’s agency (or more simply 
“freedom”) is unnecessarily restricted. Public esteem is a 
democratic demand. Certainly liberal theory has emphasized 
individual rights be accorded to free and equal citizens as a 
response to this demand, but there is no reason at the outset 
to deny that minority identity groups share this demand for 
public recognition. 
Stereotypes, racial and religious profiling and other like 
social and political slights constitute harm not only for indi-
viduals who face these things, but also for members of the 
broader minority identity group to which they belong. It is 
not simply that these misrecognitions are nasty to endure; 
they unjustifiably deny free and equal citizenship; they re-
strict freedom.  
What individuals will freely choose to do and be is de-
pendent on what they value. If and when the individual’s 
values change, the individual will choose different things, 
but where do the values come from in the first place? To 
paraphrase Charles Taylor, people constantly make discrim-
inative decisions based on the values they hold, which come 
to them through dialogic processes whereby moral frames 
come to bind their identities. The framework is understood 
as a moral background.
5
  An individual's ability to define and 
choose what is good cannot be separated from her notions of 
what “good” is. The “good” is defined dialogically, or in 
relation to others, and thus cannot be separated from lan-
guage and culture, both of which are constitutive elements of 
one's identity (1994: 32). Persons’ identities, which are with-
in shared frameworks, orient people’s lives to give direction 
on what is worthwhile and what is not.  It is also impossible 
for an individual to understand his or her own identity with-
out reference to others.  
In plural societies, no single moral framework is univer-
sally accepted as true or good. What is good or worthwhile is 
contested. Yet, frameworks provide “...the context within 
which the question of meaning has its place.” To answer 
quintessentially human questions like “what is worthwhile” 
or “what is valuable” requires one have a framework of 
meaning and that provides such an answer (1989: 27). One's 




Taking individual freedom seriously in liberal theory has 
come to mean that one must retain the ability to revise one’s 
most sacred values. Respect for the individual in liberal 
thought has generally been articulated in terms of individual 
rights (1989: 11). Identity is trickier as it has been bound up 
with notions of authenticity and dignity. The idea is that one 
should not have to deny one’s beliefs, desires or self-
conceptions (authenticity), and that these should be es-
teemed, or significantly recognised by others (dignity).  K. 
Anthony Appiah suggests that “authenticity” is problematic 
because it requires a rejection of convention on the one 
hand, and a recognition that identity is dialogically consti-
tuted on the other, (2005: 100-105).  This leads into a seem-
ingly difficult question. Is an authentic identity one which 
the individual in some way invents, or is it one that individu-
al in some way copies? The question is misstated if one 
accepts Taylor’s point that "We define our identity always in 
dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our 
significant others want to see in us" (1994: 32-33). An au-
thentic identity is both invented and copied; it is a dynamic 
process.  Dignity, on the other hand, is a result. It is a result 
not simply of recognising a person for who she is, but also of 
respecting her for what she values. This is a stronger version 
of respect than is generally found in the liberal literature.  
Liberalism respects the generalised person, accords her 
rights and tolerates her non-harmful activities. The stronger 
version of respect advanced here requires value to be seen 
not simply in the generalised human being, but also in the 
way, this person leads her life. Recognising a person for who 
she is (her authentic identity) means more than respecting 
her as an abstract individual. It means that others value both 
her and what she thinks of as (fundamentally) worthwhile.  
Bhikhu Parekh has argued against the universalising 
tendency of liberal theory. He thinks that liberals impose 
their views on everyone else. When this is done, liberalism 
loses its much exalted tolerance and openness, and simply 
becomes coercive. Much of the criticism focuses on the sup-
posed mistaken universalism of liberal thought, which itself 
is often bound up with an essentialist theory of human na-
ture. Surely, Parekh is right when he says, “Human beings 
are at once both natural and cultural beings, sharing a com-
mon human identity but in a culturally mediated manner.” 
From this, he argues that “equality” cannot mean “same-
ness”, but is rather linked by ideas of rights, respect, oppor-
tunity, power, and capacities required for living a good hu-
man life, which will turn out to be rather variable (242-3). 
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6: Identity and Respect 
 
Identity, agency and respect are interrelated. Respect, un-
derstood merely as recognition of the individual right holder 
(citizen), misses this connection. The universal view of re-
spect is that it is conferred when one recognises the individ-
ual rights of another. The stronger notion of respect indi-
cates an appreciation of what the individual values, in addi-
tion to valuing the individual per se.  
The political bases of self-respect are engendered by free 
and equal citizenship. The social bases are wider than this; 
they entail that others value one not simply as a fellow hu-
man being (the universal individual found in much liberal 
thought), nor in the generalised citizen (Rawls), but in find-
ing one’s person, beliefs and deeds valued by others. There is 
no necessary reason to view these differing bases of self-
respect as opposed to, or in competition with one another, 
but it does seem that the political bases of self-respect do not 
go far enough on their own. For example, I may be in a so-
cially and politically disadvantaged position in society. I may 
well view the political and economic systems as in the inter-
ests of others. Granting me free and equal citizenship may 
seem rather hollow to me. I do not vote, perhaps my fellow 
citizens pass me by on the street and call me a “bum”, or 
some racially charged slur as the case may be. The rights of 
citizenship may not be much of a foundation for my self-
respect. 
The weak (universal) view of respect leads to viewing 
persons as ends rather than means, seeing them as individu-
al rights holders, and tolerating their non-harmful activities. 
Toleration can lead to changes in what is considered reason-
able over time; it can lead to widening pluralism and greater 
acceptance, even appreciation, of difference. It can lead to a 
more secure social base of self-respect for marginalised or 
previously marginalised identity groups. There is no need to 
see the universal view of respect and opposed to the social 
view of respect. The two are, in fact, complimentary. 
Rawls argued that democratic citizens are to express 
their goods (what they value) through their reasonable and 
rational plans of life. One’s rational “plan of life” should be 
an efficient and achievable route to one’s main goals and 
aspirations in life. Reasonable is a moral category. It limits 
rational pursuits in ways often reminiscent of Mill’s harm 
principle. Rawls argued that people would use primary 
goods as all-purpose means to express what they value. 
Rawls thought the most important primary good was the 
social bases of self-respect (1971: 440). In considering the 
social bases of self-respect in relation to what people value, 
the practical limit of liberal pluralism is clarified. Too wide a 
pluralism jeopardises the social bases of self-respect. This 
has the further effect of endangering the freedom and equali-
ty of citizens. The issue is how to balance the goal of creating 
free and equal individual citizens, with the recognition that 
individuals are socially constituted through interactions with 
others; and understanding that “culture” is a central forma-
tive element of these social constructs. 
Rawls discussed people in a specific and limited sense, 
the person as a generalised citizen. One difficulty with this is 
discussing people as generalised citizens glosses over issues 
of identity, and neglects to indicate how closely linked one’s 
values are to one’s social environment. For example, Rawls 
asserted that citizens would have two moral powers (a sense 
of justice and an ability to form a conception of the good). To 
have a sense of justice is to have a public sense of right and 
wrong. To form a conception of the good is to have a sense of 
fundamental value. Where do these moral powers come 
from? Rationality alone cannot identify one’s ends or good. 
One must reference, to borrow Rawls’ terms, the relevant 
features of one’s life and self-knowledge. These are more 
naturally discussed as part of one’s identity than they are as 
aspects of rationality.   
Rawls discussed what individuals' value through the con-
cept of life plans. An individual's plan (understood as a 
rational and reasonable expression of one's deep aspirations) 
can be criticised and rendered illegitimate in two ways. A 
plan is poor if it is not rational given the individual's capaci-
ties, aspirations, activities, and values. A plan is ruled out if 
it is not reasonable (publicly justifiable). Non-reasonable 
and non-rational plans are either discouraged, or prohibited 
(1993: 61, and 2001: 153).  
Rawls distinguished between two aspects of identity—
public identity (the person as citizen), and the broader non-
institutional (or moral) identity—capturing the person’s 
enduring aims and commitments. Rawls explained, for ex-
ample that: 
[W]hen citizens convert from one religion to another… they 
do not cease to be, for questions of political justice, the same 
person they were before. There is no loss of what we may 
call their public or institutional identity… There is a second 
sense of identity specified by reference to citizens’ deeper 
aims and commitments. Let’s call it their non-institutional 
or moral identity, (2001: 30). 
The public identity indicates that citizens will endorse the 
same political values, which enables them to form an over-
lapping consensus. These shared political values are to be 
valued as part of citizens’ non-institutional or moral identi-
ties, which encompass the enduring aims and commitments 
of the individual. The public identity or citizenship leads to 
the political bases of self-respect. The moral identity is men-
tioned by Rawls, but left unexplored because this was be-
yond the scope of his project. He was attempting to carry the 
social contact tradition to higher level of abstraction; at-
tempting to find a political basis for democratic justice. One 
difficulty with this in regards to this project is that is that 
instead of discussing what the individual values through 
moral identity, Rawls attempted to discuss this through the 
concept of rationality.  
Rawls argued that it was reasonable to exclude compre-
hensive views, which could not be publicly justified to others 
given the principles of justice (2001: 153). This requires 
more specification. Is the unreasonable view the one, which 
cannot be justified to others without reference to controver-
sial comprehensive views? Alternatively, is the unreasonable 
view the one which violates the principles of justice, and 
hence the rights of other citizens? It must be the second 
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characterisation otherwise there is no way to account for the 
fluidity of what is taken to be reasonable.  
 
7: Invoking the Harm Principle to account for 
shifts in Reasonableness over time 
 
The Rawlsian moral category of reasonableness must limit 
the diversity of values and conceptions of the good as this 
relates to citizens reciprocally understanding one another as 
free and equal. The problem arises when one perceives that 
if there is a range of reasonable doctrines, then there must 
also be a range of unreasonable doctrines.  What needs to be 
worked out is a clearer answer for excluding some unreason-
able doctrines, but allowing that others may become reason-
able over time. Mill provides inspiration here as well. The 
permanently unreasonable doctrines are those, which harm 
others. Mill’s harm principle provides two clear limitations 
on conceptions of the good. Mill stated: 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individual-
ly, or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of 
their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant (1859, reprinted 1978: 9). 
Those who hold comprehensive doctrines, which insist on or 
encourage the harming of others, will be permanently unrea-
sonable. But what of those who hold doctrines the political 
majority simply does not like? Rawls has given considerable 
protection against state and society by giving his liberty 
principle lexical priority. The liberty of the individual cannot 
be violated except for wider for all. Taken together, Rawls’s 
first principle of justice and Mill’s harm principle begin to 
specify the range of unreasonable doctrines.  
Over time what is thought to be reasonable (both in 
terms of social conscience and in law) changes. For example, 
suppose that minority identity groups have some cultural or 
other practices, which are looked upon with disdain by the 
majority. These practices, however, do not involve the harm-
ing of individuals. Though the majority may not endorse, or 
respect these practices, they will tolerate them. Over time, 
this toleration could lead to shifts in the majoritarian view of 
what may count as reasonable. This could not have occurred 
if unreasonable views and activities were excluded from 
public debate to begin with. Thus, it must be mistaken to 
argue that the Rawlsian category of reasonableness is to 
place a limit on the content of public debate—unreasonable 
doctrines are part of the public debate. By invoking the harm 
principle, one finds a reasonable ground to tolerate unrea-
sonable views, activities and states of affairs. If no one is 
harmed, unreasonableness can be tolerated. 
 
7.1: Protecting the Scope of Liberty  
Just as there are certain parallels between Mill’s harm prin-
ciple and Rawls’s reasonable criterion, there are similarities 
between the two philosophers in protecting the scope of 
liberty. Rawls thought liberty to be so important he en-
shrined it in a sacrosanct principle of justice. The problem is 
not with that, but an effect of that effort. Rawls was attempt-
ing to carry the social contract tradition to higher order of 
abstraction. His principles of justice are highly generalised. 
It is not obvious how the first principle and reasonableness 
relate. Consider Rawls’s first principle of justice alongside 
Mill’s reasons to protect free speech. Rawls’s first principle 
of justice is: 
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully ade-
quate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is com-
patible with the same scheme of liberties for all… (2001: 42). 
I see no difficulties with either the content or intent of the 
first principle. Rather, the problem is one of specification. It 
is not clear just what sorts of values, beliefs and activities are 
supported under Rawls’s liberty principle. Again, this is not 
to indicate a problem with Rawls’s theory, but rather to 
assert that more specification is required to use Justice as 
Fairness to inform the actual practice of plural democracy.  
Rawls characterised his theory as applying to plural 
democratic societies. The “plural” was to indicate that citi-
zens had differing and often conflicting conceptions of the 
good. Liberty is endorsed to allow all to express their varying 
conceptions of the good, but this is not the only reason to 
endorse a wide variety of liberties. In any free society, it 
would appear inevitable that some minority views will devel-
op in direct contrast to majority views. This seems true both 
morally and politically. If reasonableness is, in part, a major-
ity moral code, then one might expect resistance to it. Some 
views may, in the first instance, be incorrectly categorised as 
unreasonable. In the second instance, some views may be 
unreasonable at one point in time and reasonable in another.  
In the first instance, there is a failure on the part of gov-
ernment and citizens to appreciate the extent of reasonable 
difference. The second instance is more interesting. How 
might an unreasonable doctrine become reasonable? Cer-
tainly, Rawls was willing to extend tolerance where he could, 
but Mill has a more concrete approach, which is to remind 
people why toleration and free speech among those who 
vehemently disagree is so important. Mill stated: 
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, only one per-
son were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no 
more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had 
the power would be justified in silencing mankind (1859, re-
printed 1993, 16). 
Mill had several reasons to support this strong statement of 
toleration. Mill stated: 
[I]f any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may… 
be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility… 
[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very 
commonly does, contain a portion of truth…. [E]ven if the 
received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; un-
less it is suffered to be … earnestly contested, it will… be 
held in a manner of prejudice, with little comprehension… 
of its rational grounds… [T]he meaning of the doctrine itself 
will be in danger o being lost… the dogma becoming a mere 
formal profession… (1959, reprinted 1993: 50). 
Some unreasonable views should always be prohibited be-
cause they involve or encourage the harming of others. There 
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are, however, less extreme unreasonable views. These ought 
to be tolerated for the reasons Mill indicated. In addition to 
these, however, they should be tolerated to allow their prac-
titioners the opportunity to shift the bounds of reasonable-
ness, to be more fully included in society.  
This approach is better for another reason as well. If rad-
ical views are not heard, radicals often tend change their 
tactics to force whole societies to pay attention. They can 
become violent. This is as true for political as it is for reli-
gious ideologies. Care must be taken here though because 
radicals and fundamentalists will not always accept demo-
cratic defeat. The coercive force of the state is inescapable. 
The question is not and cannot be how the plural, democrat-
ic state can become non-coercive, and fully inclusive. Rather, 
the issue is what is the least coercive way to deal with the 
fundamental disagreements that diversity gives rise to? 
 
8: Concluding Remarks 
 
If what counts as reasonable shifts over time, then some 
may not find the social bases of self-respect in the society. 
This may be the case even when persons are accorded the 
political bases of self-respect entailed in formal citizenship. 
Can anyone deny that the prospects for a black person in the 
United States in 1961 are rather different from the prospects 
of a similarly gifted black person in 2011? That such a person 
in 1961 had a far more diminished opportunity to find the 
social bases of self-respect than a similar person in 2010 is 
obvious. 
What counts as good and valuable, and reasonable and 
respectable in a society will shift over time. It is likely that 
some will not enjoy the good of self-respect. But what is the 
supposed value of freedom and equality if one does not have 
self-respect? Plural democracies must take care to foster the 
social bases of self-respect. Fostering these social bases of 
self-respect, it seems, occurs in a couple of ways. The tradi-
tional liberal way of doing this is to accord individual citi-
zens’ rights. The Rawlsian innovation was to limit pluralism 
to a publicly acceptable range (reasonableness). Individual 
citizens would have equal rights, a fair value for extensive 
liberties, and an overlapping consensus regarding the con-
tent of justice and morally permissible doctrines and activi-
ties.  
Reasonableness is not static; it shifts across time and 
place. Comprehensive views, which encourage their practi-
tioners to harm others, are permanently unreasonable, and 
can be justly prohibited. Other unreasonable views may 
simply offend (mildly or not) the majority’s moral code. So 
long as the practitioners of these views do not harm others 
they should be tolerated. Toleration of these views can lead 
to shifts in what is thought to be reasonable over time. Tol-
eration respects the individual rights of members of margin-
alised groups. Toleration is extended because we see value in 
the individual as an individual human being. It does not, 
however extend the recognition of value to the individual’s 
projects and aspirations. In this sense, it falls short of the 
social bases of self-respect understood as seeing value in 
ones person and projects. This means those who are merely 
tolerated will have a less secure social foundation for self-
respect than others; at least in the short run. Tolerating such 
people’s beliefs and activities gives them the opportunity 
however, to shift the bounds of reasonableness over time so 
that may be more fully recognised and included in a plural 
democratic society. 
I have argued that unreasonable doctrines promote or 
endorse the harming of others. There are, of course, many 
different types of harm. One of the types of harm taken to be 
significant here is the misrecognition of identity, which as 
Taylor states: “…can be a form of oppression, imprisoning 
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of living” 
(1994: 25). Misrecognition of identity can harm in the sense 
that it can restrict the agency and opportunity of the misrec-
ognised. It also erodes the social bases of self-respect. The 
misrecognised are part of the least-advantaged because their 
agency and opportunities can be restricted as compared to 
fellow citizens. Minority identity groups (who generally 
constitute the misrecognised in society) do not do as well as 
other citizens in social, economic and political terms. The 
broad conclusion of this paper then, is that the misrecogni-
tion of identity constitutes harm. Misrecognition of identity 
can restrict agency and deny the social bases of self-respect. 
Those who have non or misrecognised identities constitute 
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Endnote	  
1  This essay focuses on the second type of disadvantage, the 
misrecognition of identity. I have previously discussed disad-
vantage in terms of capability (Amartya Sen’s term) in “The 
Means to Social Justice: Accounting for Functional Capabilities 
in the Rawlsian approach” in “Canadian Journal of Political 
Science” 41:4, December 2008. 
2  Rawls attributes the distinction between the reasonable and the 
rational to W.M. Sibley in “The rational versus the Reasonable,” 
Philosophical Review 62 (October 1953). 
	  
3  Charles Taylor makes this distinction between different kinds of 
respect. See, for example, chapter 1 of Sources of the Self, es-
pecially page 15. 
4  See, for example,  Sen, Amartya. 1997. "Equality of What", In 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. Robert 
E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
5  See Charles Taylor’s chapter 1 of Sources of the Self, “Inesca-
pable Frameworks”, especially page 17. Taylor’s discussion of 
horizons in “What is Human Agency” in Charles Taylor, Human 
Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985 is also 
instructive on this point. 
